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During the past 10 years, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has per-
formed a study to control hydrogen gas in the containment of the nuclear power plants.
Before the Fukushima accident, analytical activities for gas distribution analysis in ex-
periments and plants were primarily conducted using a multidimensional code: the
GASFLOW. After the Fukushima accident, the COM3D code, which can simulate a multi-
dimensional hydrogen explosion, was introduced in 2013 to complete the multidimen-
sional hydrogen analysis system. The code validation efforts of the multidimensional
codes of the GASFLOW and the COM3D have continued to increase confidence in the use of
codes using several international experimental data. The OpenFOAM has been prelimi-
narily evaluated for APR1400 containment, based on experience from coded validation and
the analysis of hydrogen distribution and explosion using the multidimensional codes, the
GASFLOW and the COM3D. Hydrogen safety in nuclear power has become a much more
important issue after the Fukushima event in which hydrogen explosions occurred. The
KAERI is preparing a large-scale test that can be used to validate the performance of do-
mestic passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) and can provide data for the validation of
the severe accident code being developed in Korea.
Copyright © 2015, Published by Elsevier Korea LLC on behalf of Korean Nuclear Society.1. Introduction
After the Three Mile Island Reactor 2 (TMI-2) accident (near
Middletown, PA, USA) in 1979, a substantial amount of
research has been performed to control hydrogen gas in the
containment. In European countries, an important research
result to control hydrogen gas is the implementation of. Hong).
under the terms of the
ich permits unrestricted
cited.
sevier Korea LLC on behapassive autocatalytic recombiners for pressurized water re-
actors (PWRs) with a large dry containment. However, the
boiling water reactor (BWR), which has a relatively very small
containment volume in comparison to a PWR was adapted as
an inert concept to control hydrogen gas by injecting nitrogen
gas into a small containment. This concept to control
hydrogen gas in a BWR was an action item after the TMI-2Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any me-
lf of Korean Nuclear Society.
Fig. 1 e Hydrogen and steam source in loss of coolant accident.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 3e4 634accident [1]. However, hydrogen explosions unfortunately
occurred in the reactor building of the BWRs of the
Fukushima plants [2]. This explosion caused the large
release of the fission product into the environment.
After the large explosions in the Fukushima accident, a
precise prediction of gas distribution under various contain-
ment thermal hydraulic conditions has become an important
issue. The explosion behavior can be estimated from precise
hydrogen distribution in the containment. However, it is not
easy to precisely predict the hydrogen distribution in a
containment where many structures and components exist.
In addition, hydrogen experts are interested in hydrogen ex-
plosion behavior based on the hydrogen distribution because
the reactor building was destroyed by hydrogen explosions in
the Fukushima plants.
Two international activities commenced after the
Fukushima accident. The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/
NEA) Hydrogen Mitigation Experiments for Reactor Safety
(HYMERS) project [3] was launched to precisely predict gas
distribution in the containment. The main objective of this
project is to enhance the reliability of advanced
computational analysis devoted to containment thermal
hydraulics. It is necessary to continue the validation of
models of the code to improve confidence in the plant
analysis results and the predictive ability of the models of
the code; to have experiments with a well-instrumented
spatial and temporal grid in line with modeling issues and
with real control of the boundary conditions; to reach a
significant level of accuracy on the gas mixture composition
during the mixing process because the consequences of a
combustion [e.g., 11e13 volume percent (vol%) of hydrogen
in air] can be totally different; and to cover the broad
spectrum of phenomena during a severe accident in a light
water reactor (LWR) such as geometric effects and the
effects of safety systems.
Another international activity to remove the hydrogen
threat is the performance test of PARs, which can simulate an
accident without electricity under severe accidents condi-
tions, thus, the OECD/NEA Thermal-hydraulic, Hydrogen,
Aerosol and Iodine (THAI) Project was performed [4]. The
frame of the first phase of the OECDeTHAI project wasaimed at providing nonexistent or inaccessible experimental
data for the validation of developed analysis methods and
codes to predict hydrogen distribution, combustion
behavior, and PAR behavior under representative reactor
conditions. Significant progress has been achieved by
demonstrating the transferability of helium to hydrogen
distribution behavior and by providing comprehensive data
for the validation of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and
lumped parameter simulation codes. With regard to code
validation, phenomena such as the formation and
dissolution of the stratification of different gases remain
partly open. In spite of significant improvements in available
computer codes, deficiencies still exist in modeling certain
phenomena. Uncertainties continue to appear in the
modeling of deflagrations and the modeling of the
performance of PAR under special conditions such as an
under spray or low oxygen supply. The general performance
of the PAR is satisfactory, but some adverse effects occur
with iodine present in the gases. An effort to validate the
performance of PARs has continued. The original objectives
of the OECD-THAI2 [5], which was a follow-up project to the
OECD-THAI1, will address open questions concerning the
behavior of: (1) graphite dust transport in a generic high-
temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) geometry; (2) release
of gaseous iodine from a flashing jet and iodine deposition
on aerosol particles; and (3) hydrogen combustion during
spray operation and PAR operation under the condition of
extremely low oxygen content. However, after the
Fukushima accident, the test cases have been changed
toward PAR performance tests with spray operation.2. Outstanding issues
The integral analysis codes, the so-called lumped codes such
as the Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP) [6] and the
Methods for Estimation of Leakages and Consequences of
Releases (MELCOR) [7], were primarily used in the past
and are now the main tools used to evaluate hydrogen
safety in nuclear plants. These lumped codes are capable
of easily analyzing an accident sequence for a long time
with regard to the computational calculation time. The
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 3e4 6 35multidimensional analysis codes in parallel have recently
been used to compensate the limitation of lumped codes
that cannot trace local hydrogen concentration in the
containment. The necessity of multidimensional codes for
hydrogen safety is introduced in this paper by reviewing the
previous studies.
KIT (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology) compared the gas
distribution in the containment of the Western generic PWR
reactor type using the MELCOR, lumped parameter code, and
the GASFLOW [8], a multidimensional analysis code. The
GASFLOW shows probable explosive mixtures in a specific
area, whereas the MELCOR shows no explosive mixtures [9].
The MELCOR code, which is a lumped code, cannot take
local hydrogen concentration, which affects the hydrogen
combustion and the evaluation of PAR performance. It is
accordingly believed that the multidimensional analysis has
to be accompanied in parallel with the lumped parameter
analysis for the evaluation of hydrogen safety.
Hydrogen distribution analysis for the APR1400 using the
GASFLOW codewas performed for the loss of coolant accident
(LOCA) sequence at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Insti-
tute (KAERI) [10]. Fig. 1 shows the hydrogen release rate into
the containment for the LOCA sequence of the ARP1400, and
Fig. 2 shows the amount of hydrogen removed by PARs with
the passage of time. As Fig. 3 shows, if the remaining
hydrogen is not removed by the PARs at a specific time and
it accumulates in the local area and over the flammability
limit, it may cause a hydrogen explosion from an ignition
source by chance before the PARs can remove sufficient
hydrogen. An accurate hydrogen distribution analysis in the
containment using the multidimensional code is accordingly
important to predict hydrogen explosion behavior and to
effectively remove the hydrogen in the containment by the
PAR through selecting the proper location for the PAR.
JNES (Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization) per-
formed a hydrogen explosion analysis of the Fukushima ac-
cident [11]. In Unit 1, it was assumed that the released flow
rate of hydrogen gas was 100 kg/h for 4 hours. The released
hydrogen gas accumulated evenly in the top of the floor (5F)
with a high concentration of approximately 20%. In Unit 3,Time (s)
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Fig. 2 e Hydrogen removal rate by passive autocatalytic
recombiners.they assumed that the released flow rate of the hydrogen
gas was 200 kg/h for 5 hours and the released hydrogen gas
accumulated evenly in the whole reactor building with a
high concentration of approximately 16e17%. They insisted
that hydrogen explosion simulation under the assumption
of different hydrogen distributions in two plants was well
performed by showing similar results to those of the
accident. From the JNES analysis result, different hydrogen
distributions may affect different hydrogen explosion
behaviors. Hydrogen distribution in a reactor building in the
Fukushima plants remains unknown and will not be
predicted in the future because a hydrogen explosion
occurred in the past.
In summary, the use of a multidimensional code to predict
the hydrogen distribution in a containment is important: (1) to
support the calculation results from the lumped code; (2) to
provide the best location of PARs which are installed in
various regions of the containment; (3) to evaluate the regu-
latory requirement of hydrogen control; and (4) to provide
information on hydrogen distribution to hydrogen explosion
code. Detailed analysis on hydrogen distribution and explo-
sion behavior using a multidimensional code has become
more important because a hydrogen explosion occurred in the
Fukushima plants.
Performance tests to the PAR developed in other countries
have meanwhile been performed in a large-scale test vessel
because PAR operation induces a natural circulation flow.
Even though the structure of the PAR is different, the general
features of PAR performance were found using a 60-m3 vessel
in a THAI facility. The general performance from the THAI
experimental facility was known [12]. The performance of PAR
increases with increasing initial pressure. The steam delays
the start-up time of the PAR. Ignition of hydrogen by PARs isFig. 3 e Hydrogen clouds at 10% and 5% at 6,200 seconds.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 3e4 636possible. The ignition source is suspected to be the high
surface temperature of the catalyst at high hydrogen
concentrations. A low oxygen concentration decreases the
performance of PAR.
The SNL (Sandia National Laboratories) performed PAR
performance in a Surtsey vessel of 100 m3 [13]. Most general
features are similar to the THAI test results. One important
finding in the SNL test was that the PAR appeared to
generate a convective flow loop in the Surtsey vessel from
the PAR outlet to the dome, down the Surtsey wall until
reaching a height near the PAR inlet, and then back to the
PAR inlet. This was indicated by relatively flat and equal
temperatures from the thermocouples located at elevations
below the PAR. Because the PAR only consumes hydrogen in
a portion of the total vessel volume, a depletion rate
calculation that assumes a well-mixed condition in the code
overpredicts consumption. In addition, counterpart
experiments determined that the placement of a PAR near a
wall yielded depletion rates smaller than those obtained
with a PAR placed in the middle of the facility.
The PARs in a Korean plant are located in the near wall of
the structure, and the performance test of PARs developed in
Korea are performed in a very relatively scale vessel [14]. It is
not possible to see the overall performance because the small
vessel height is insufficient to induce a natural circulation
flow. Therefore, the performance test under various
conditions of the Korean PAR need to be performed.Fig. 4 e PANDA nodalization.3. Research activities at the KAERI for
hydrogen mitigation
3.1. Analytical activities
It is commonly understood that having accurate numerical
solutions of hydrogen behaviors and explosions occurring in a
containment during a severe accident condition is very diffi-
cult. This is because many phenomena such as buoyant jet,
steam condensation, heat transfer, hydrogen recombination,
and combustion occur in a coupledmanner, and because large
discrepancies exist in length and time scales between acci-
dent progression in a real containment and in local phe-
nomena. Numerical predictions of some local phenomena
nevertheless rely on simple correlations instead of universal
models. Sometimes reducing temporal or spatial resolution is
required to obtain an approximate solution of a numerical
analysis from a currently available computer program. How-
ever, the prediction of hydrogen distribution and explosion by
experts with physical and numerical understanding using a
code with well benchmarked numerical and physical models
will increase the confidence of the results of plant analysis.
The objective of a hydrogen analysis at KAERI is to analyze
and evaluate the hydrogen safety of Korean nuclear plants
during a severe accident. It is very important to have confi-
dence in the computed results by the code, the validation of an
analysis code, and evaluation of models implemented in the
code. Some efforts have been made to validate the code in
parallel with the plant analysis.
From the analyses of a separate effect test such as the
PANDA [15], it is possible to have physical insight to hydrogenbehaviors in compartments and choose optimal numerical
schemes to obtain confident solutions from the GASFLOW
code. Fig. 4 shows PANDA nodalization and Fig. 5 shows the
simulation results for test 9bis in which the injected
superheated vapor was condensed on the cold wall of the
test vessel. The analysis results well agreed with the
experimental results. The volume flow rates at the vent
rapidly reduced over the inlet flow to some plateau values,
which reflect the cooling of the injected steam by mixing
with air. A further decay to a second plateau occurs in the
test after the onset of condensation at approximately 3,000
seconds. This plateau is controlled by the constant pressure
of 1.3 bar at the vent and is well predicted in the GASFLOW
and Generation of Thermal Hydraulic Information in
Containments (GOTHIC) codes.
For the hydrogen distribution analysis, KAERI has per-
formed code benchmark analyses and plant application for
the past 10 years [16]. Some interest in multidimensional
analysis of hydrogen explosion has recently increased to
evaluate flame acceleration and obtain a mechanical load on
a containment wall during a severe accident. Table 1 shows
some specific features of the multidimensional analysis
codes that are applied for a nuclear power plant [17e19]. To
select the multidimensional hydrogen explosion code among
the available codes, KAERI first considered the applicability of
the code to a nuclear power plant and the efficiency of
connection with the analysis code of hydrogen distribution,
GASFLOW. On considering these factors, the COM3D code
[20] was ultimately selected for the hydrogen explosion
analysis.
Fig. 6 shows the analysis result using the ANSYS CFX-13
[21] in comparison with the COM3D result for the ENACCEF
test results [22] with a hydrogen concentration of 13% and
an obstacle blockage ratio of 0.63. In the COM3D analysis, a
three-dimensional grid model with a quarter symmetric
condition was generated. Approximately 439,676 hexahedral
cells with a cell length of 7 mm were generated in the grid
model. The KYLCOMþ model with the Schmidt turbulent
flame speed model was used to simulate hydrogen flame
propagation in the COM3D calculation [20]. A turbulent flow
Fig. 5 e Comparison of the results by GASFLOW and by
experiment.
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Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 3e4 6 37was modeled using the standard k-e turbulent model. A wall
condition with a constant temperature of 298 K was applied
on the outer surface of the grid model. The time step size for
the COM3D calculations was automatically controlled to
assure a CouranteFriedrichseLewy (CFL) number below 0.9.
The proposed COM3D model accurately predicted the
measured flame front time-of-arrivals (TOAs) with an error
range of approximately 10% over the entire range (Fig. 6A).
The flame position in the CFD result was defined at the time
the gas temperature increased to approximately 850 K at
locations PM1 to PM16. The COM3D results overpredicted the
peak pressure of the test results with an error range of
approximately 20%, whereas the CFX accurately predicts it
with an error range of approximately 10% (Fig. 6B). In the
CFX calculation, the turbulent flame closure model constant
changed from 2.0 to 5.0 after the flame arrived at the top of
the dome region to prevent the retardation of the flame
propagation rising from a local pressure buildup at an edge
of the dome region in the grid model [23]. However, the
computational time to complete the hydrogen flame
propagation in the grid model was approximately 10 times
faster than that of the CFX results, even though the number
of mesh between the grid models is different. Therefore, the
COM3D is a very efficient code for predicting the pressure
behavior resulting from hydrogen flame acceleration. The
code validation efforts will be continued by joining the
OECD/THAI-2 and OECD-HYMERS programs, and will finally
be applied to Korean nuclear power plants.
To determine the applicability of the COM3D in a real
plan, a preliminary COM3D analysis was performed to
analyze the hydrogen flame propagation in the APR1400
containment using the calculated hydrogen distribution by
the GASFLOW code for a station blackout accident [24]. The
grid model representing the APR1400 containment (Fig. 7)
was also transferred from the GASFLOW to the COM3D by
reducing the cell length to approximately 0.25 m.
Therefore, 5,931,678 hexahedral cells were generated for
the hydrogen combustion in the grid model. The cell
length was determined to resolve accurately the pressure
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 3e4 638wave propagation generated from the combusted region [25]
and to model the important structures in the containment.
The KYLCOMþ model with the Kawanabe turbulent flame
speed model [20] was used to simulate the hydrogen flame
propagation in the COM3D calculation. The turbulent flow
was modeled by the standard k-e turbulent model. A time
step size for the COM3D calculations was automatically
controlled to assure a CFL number below 0.9. The wall
condition with a constant temperature of 298 K was
applied to the outer surface of the grid models. The
ignition point was assumed around the hydrogen release
location in the steam generator (SG) compartment, as
Fig. 7B shows. The ignition process was modeled by using
a hot spot region (with a radius of 0.5 m) where the
hydrogen-air chemical reaction takes place. As Figs. 8 and
9 demonstrate, the COM3D results showed that the
hydrogen flame was propagated to approximately 18 m
along the vertical direction and 10 m along the radial
direction in 0.155 seconds after the start of the ignition.Fig. 6 e Predicted results by COM3D and by CFX-13. The images
PM16 and (B) the pressure behaviors at PCB2.This flame acceleration induced the pressure to increase
to approximately 3.99  105 Pa in the neighboring
structure of the SG compartment. A detailed analysis on
the calculated temperature and pressure results will be
conducted after the hydrogen flame arrives at the top of
the containment.
Aside from using the code introduced from overseas, the
KAERI has been developing a combustion module using an
open-source CFD code, called OpenFOAM [26], and validating
it by applying it to experiments. Figs. 10 and 11 show the
simulation results of the ENACCEF experiments. The flame
speed and length were reasonably predicted. In the figures,
the quantitatively measured flame speeds were compared
for uniform hydrogen distribution. The prediction seems to
be reasonable, except for overprediction in the dome region.
The simulations by other research group also show similar
trends. It appears that experimental uncertainties may exist
in the larger volume regions (i.e., the dome). In this
situation, the maximum flame speed reaches approximatelyshow (A) the flame front time-of-arrival (TOA) from PM1 to
Fig. 7 e Isosurface of hydrogen concentration (10%) at 47,400 seconds after the start of the station blackout accident,
described by Kim et al. [24], using (A) GASFLOW and (B) COM3D.
Fig. 8 e Isotemperature of 1,000 K as time progresses after the start of the ignition. (A) 0.106s, (B) 0.123s, (C) 0.155s.
Fig. 9 e Calculated pressure distribution at 0.155 seconds after the start of the ignition.
Fig. 10 e Flame propagation in the uniform-distribution
case of ENACCEF.
Nu c l E n g T e c h n o l 4 7 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 3 3e4 640600 m/s, which indicates that turbulence generated by
obstacles installed in the pipe rapidly accelerates flame
propagation.
In an effort to evaluate mechanistically hydrogen safety
during a severe accident, multidimensional codes for the
distribution and explosion analyses codes were applied to the
APR1400 containment. During a high pressure accident such
as a station blackout (SBO), the release location of hydrogenFig 11 e Comparison of the flame speed in the uniform-
distribution case of ENACCEF.generated in a reactor pressure vessel is specific for a nuclear
power plant. For the APR1400, it is released in the in-
containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST), which is a
closed large annular compartment, except for the vent holes
on the ceiling. During a GASFLOW simulation for an SBO ac-
cident, Kim et al. [24] found that a detonable hydrogen
mixture cloud could be developed in the IRWST. In one
study [27], the effect of the IRWST vents on hydrogen flame
acceleration was studied mechanistically using the
OpenFOAM code. In a low hydrogen concentration of up to
approximately 20 vol%, the vents of the IRWST tend to
decelerate considerably the propagation of the hydrogen
flame, compared to the propagation without the vents at the
same hydrogen concentration. On the contrary, the
hydrogen flame can be accelerated, even with the vents,
when the concentration of the hydrogen is above 25 vol%.
Shin-Ulchin 1 and 2, which are construction plants of an
APR 1400, have adopted a newhydrogenmitigation strategy in
which hydrogen is released into a SG compartment by actively
turning a three-way valve when a severe accident manage-
ment (SAM) for the plant is initiated. A parametric study [28]
was conducted to mechanically evaluate the flame
acceleration characteristics, depending on the hydrogen
release location. In that study, a coupled analysis method of
the GASFLOW code for hydrogen distribution and the
OpenFOAM code for hydrogen combustion was applied to
assess the possibility of hydrogen flame acceleration during
a SBO accident in the plants. A hydrogen distribution and
other thermal hydraulic data from a GASFLOW simulation
are transferred to an OpenFOAM mesh for a combustion
analysis using the procedure shown in Fig. 12. Some utility
programs were needed to transfer data because of different
coordinate systems and mesh resolutions between the
GASFLOW and OpenFOAM codes. Two instances of a lower
hydrogen release near a SG pedestal and an upper hydrogen
release near a pressurizer bottom were simulated and
compared. Fig. 13 shows the mapped hydrogen distributions
for a combustion and flame acceleration analysis at the
moment of a maximum release rate of hydrogen. The study
showed that the flame acceleration is much stronger whenFig. 12 e The procedure to transfer data from GASFLOW to
OpenFOAM.
Fig. 13 e Hydrogen (H2) distribution obtained by GASFLOW simulations at the moment of maximum release rate of
hydrogen in (A) the lower release condition and (B) the upper release condition.
Fig. 14 e Hydrogen flame fronts using a temperature isosurface of 1,000 K and pressure distributions on the containment
wall in (A) the lower release condition and (B) the upper release condition.
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Table 2 e Design parameters of the APR1400
containment.
Parameters Value
Height 75.7 m
Diameter 45.7 m
Free air volume 88,575 m3
Zirconium mass 24,307 kg
Number of PAR 30
PAR, passive autocatalytic recombiner.
Table 3 e Calculated Ra number, based on the safety
analysis results [25].
Variable IRWST SG compartment
Distance to dome 29.5 m 41.6 m
Pressure 1.45 bar 1.45 bar
Temperature 1,200 K 600 K
H2 molar fraction 0.14 0.08
Density ~0.246 kg/m3 ~0.879 kg/m3
Ra ~1.83  1011 ~1.32  1011
H2, hydrogen; IRWST, in-containment refueling water storage tank;
Ra, Rayleigh; SG, steam generator.
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compared to the pressurizer bottom release, as Fig. 14 shows.3.2. Experimental activities
3.2.1. Scaling analysis
To determine the vessel size of a scaled-down test facility
simulating the APR1400 containment, scaling analysis was
conducted on the basis of a severe accident scaling method-
ology [29]. With regard to the hydrogen distribution in the
containment during a severe accident, the system scaling
approach (top-down) may be preserving the ratio of the
height to the diameter of the containment, the ratio of the
produced hydrogen mass from the reactor core to an air
mass in the containment, the location of hydrogen release,
and the locations of the PARs.Fig. 15 e The Rayleigh number, based on the test facility
height.Major design parameters of the APR1400 containment are
summarized in Table 2. The process approach (bottom-up) for
preserving the most important physical phenomenon is to
simulate a plume flow of hydrogen gas from the IRWST vent
hole or the SG compartment to the dome area because the
hydrogen generated in the core is discharged into the IRWST
or the SG compartment during a severe accident. The
selected nondimensional number for the process approach
is the Rayleigh number, as defined using Equation 3.2-1
[24,30]. The calculated Rayleigh number using the safety
analysis results for the APR1400 SBO sequence at
approximately 60,000 seconds is 1.32  1011  1.83  1011 [24]
(Table 3). The plume of the hydrogen gas may be a turbulent
flow because the Rayleigh number is higher than 1.0  1010.
To ensure the turbulent plume flow of the hydrogen gas in
the experiment, the height of the test facility should be
increased to approximately 9e10 m (Fig. 15), when the
hydrogen gas at temperature 310 K discharges into the air
environment at 290 K under atmospheric conditions. The
diameter of the test facility can be determined by
considering the height to diameter ratio of the APR1400
containment, as follows:
Ra ¼ bgq
00H4
ank
¼
bg

k DTH

H4
ank
¼ bgDTH
3
an
(3.2-1)
in which DT ¼ the temperature difference between the
hydrogen gas and ambient gas; a ¼ thermal diffusivity;
b ¼ thermal expansion ratio; g ¼ gravitational acceleration;
H ¼ distance over the hydrogen gas can travel; and
n ¼ kinematic viscosity.
3.2.2. Facility description
The KAERI is preparing a large test facility to examine the
safety issues, as stated in the outstanding issues related to
hydrogen distribution and combustion and the performanceFig. 16 e Schematic of the test vessel.
Fig. 17 e Corrosion of stainless steel. a Heat transfer fluid to control the temperature. b Examples of halogens are iodine,
bromine, and chlorine.
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dent situations.
The content of detailed design specification was described
in the paper [31]. The pressure vessel of the KAERI test facility
is 9.5 m in height and 3.4 m in diameter, and the total free
volume is 80 m3. The aspect ratio of height to diameter is
2.8, which is similar with that of the THAI test facility and is
adequate for scaling the containment building down to
examine the gas behavior under a severe accident. A larger
free volume, compared to that of the THAI test facility, can
offer a wide range of scaling. The design pressure of the
vessel is 1.5 MPa at 450 K, and the six legs of the vessel can
support a maximum of 130 tons (i.e., the vessel could be
entirely filled with water as a scrubbing solution). The
pressure vessel includes five separate double walls from the
bottom head to the top head to control independently the
wall temperature at various elevations, and to reduce the
heat loss from a vessel to the environment. Fifty-one flanges
of different sizes are installed on the wall at various
elevations and orientations for the supply systems of steam,
gases, and aerosols, and for measurement systems of gas
distribution and aerosol characteristic. Fig. 16 shows a
schematic of the KAERI test facility. Stainless steel 316L was
chosen as the vessel material because of its corrosion
resistance for a long operating time. Fig. 17 shows the
possibility of corrosion of the test vessel. Stainless steel
iron-based alloy with low carbon is a good choice to resist
high corrosion under experimental conditions of steam and
fission products.
In March 2014, a pressure vessel with the specifications
mentioned previously was constructed and installed at the
KAERI site. The construction of additional facilities and sys-
tems for operating the KAERI test facility is an ongoing pro-
cess. The commissioning tests for controlling the thermalhydraulic conditions and gas concentration at the KAERI test
facility will be conducted soon.
3.3. Test plan
The KAERI derived the research items to study the phenom-
ena in the containment and to determine the performance of
the accident mitigation systems (Fig. 18). Several phenomena
have to be handled and have a connection with each other.
The first use of the KAERI facility will focus on the study of
the characteristics of a hydrogen mitigation system because
in Korea various types of PARs have been installed in the
containments of Korean nuclear plants as one of post-
Fukushima actions [32]. Other research items will be focused
on later because the test results of the PARs performance
are first on demand from the utility and regulatory bodies.
Table 4 shows the PAR installation status and plan in Korea.
For operating plants, the utility company Korea Hydro and
Nuclear Power (KHNP) completed the installation of PARs by
the end of 2013. Most PARs used in Korean nuclear power
plants are PARs developed by domestic companies. The
APR1400 containment has its own compartmentalization
features. The compartments in the APR1400 containment
(Fig. 19) are a relatively open structure between
compartments to induce gas released from the primary
system to mix well and thereby result in protection from the
local accumulation of hydrogen. The number of PARs in the
APR1400 containment is also relatively small. Fig. 20 shows
the location of the PARs in the containment. The KAERI
plans to conduct performance tests of Korean PARs in a
large-scale vessel with a volume over 80 m3 under various
severe accidents.
In addition, interaction tests between PARs located in the
containment need to be conducted because the APR1400 has
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The test results under severe accident conditions will be
useful in compensating the PAR correlations made by the
venders and will be used for optimization of PAR installation
in a containment.Fig. 18 e Phenomena occurring in a nuclear power plant contai
filtered venting system); HMS (Hydrogen Mitigation System); IR
(passive autocatalytic recombiner).4. Discussion
The activities on hydrogen safety after the Fukushima acci-
dent are briefly reviewed. The outstanding issues from the
recent research results concerning hydrogen safety arenment in relation to hydrogen safety. CFVS (containment
WST (in-containment refueling water storage tank); PAR
Table 4 e The Korean Hydro and Nuclear Power passive autocatalytic recombiner installation status and plan.
Plant Manufacturer Schedule Plant Manufacturer Schedule
Kori 1 AECL 09.12 UCN 5 Ceracomb '13.05
Kori 2 Ceracomb '13.05 UCN 6 Ceracomb 12.10
Kori 3 Ceracomb 12.10 Woulsung 1 KNT 11.05
Kori 4 Ceracomb '13.01 Woulsung 2 Ceracomb '13.05
YGN 1 Ceracomb '13.08 Woulsung 3 Ceracomb '13.06
YGN 2 Ceracomb '13.01 Woulsung 4 Ceracomb '13.02
YGN 3 Ceracomb '12.10 ShinKori 1 AREVA/KNT 12.01
YGN 4 Ceracomb '13.10 ShinKori 2 AREVA/KNT 11.10
YGN 5 Ceracomb '13.09 ShinWonsung 1 AREVA/KNT 11.10
YGN 6 Ceracomb '12.11 ShinWonsung 2 AREVA/KNT 12.03
UCN 1 Ceracomb '13.09 ShinKori 3 KNT 12.08
UCN 2 Ceracomb '13.04 ShinKori 4 KNT 12.10
UCN 3 Ceracomb 12.09 Shin UCN 1 KNT '15.09
UCN 4 Ceracomb '12.12 Shin UCN 2 KNT '16.07
AECL (Canadian nuclear vendor), AREVA (French nuclear vendor), KNT (Koran PAR vendor), Ceracomb (Korean PAR vendor), UCN (Ulchin),
YGN (Younggwang).
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tion and explosion in parallel is requiredwith lumped codes to
resolve hydrogen issues. It is specifically expected that
multidimensional analysis for hydrogen distribution is
necessary for determining the location and number of PARs to
be installed in the containment.
The KAERI research activities for coping with the hydrogen
threat have been introduced. Code validation efforts for
hydrogen distribution and explosion using multidimensional
codes such as GASFLOW and COM3D have been performed,
and the results of these codes have reasonably agreed with
experimental results. Based on the experience of code vali-
dation, the analysis on hydrogen distribution and explosion
using the multidimensional codes, GASFLOW, COM3D, andFig. 19 e Schematic of the ARP1400 containment
dimension in meter.OpenFOAM, have been preliminarily evaluated for APR1400.
This application effort will continue so that a reasonable level
of the calculation results can be reached for plant application.
In addition, the conservative hydrogen distribution and ex-
plosion at 100% MWR in a reactor vessel will be performed
using this multidimensional analysis system.
KAERI is preparing a large-scale test to resolve hydrogen
issues. The first use of the KAERI facility will focus on studying
the characteristics of a hydrogen mitigation system because
various types of PARs have been installed in the containments
of Korean nuclear plants as a post-Fukushima action. The
Korean utility and regulatory bodies are first demanding the
test results of PAR performance. The experiment will be
accompanied by validation with multidimensional analysis.Fig. 20 e The passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs)
location in the ARP1400 containment (the pink squares
indicate each PAR location).
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